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Chapter Two  
Party system change in EU countries: 
 long-term instability and cleavage restructuring 
vincenzo emanuele and bruno marino
This chapter deals with the analysis of party system change in Europe after the 2019 
European Parliament (EP) elections. Our task is threefold. First, we explore the pat-
terns of electoral instability in Europe at the 2019 EP elections and compare them 
across countries and over time. Second, we compare trends and variations in elec-
toral instability between national and EP elections, following the expectations de-
rived from the SecondOorder Election (SOE) theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Third, 
we aim to understand the underlying dimensions of competition and cleavage struc-
tures in the 28 European party systems. From an empirical viewpoint, our analysis 
is based on data taken from a recently published dataset on electoral volatility and 
its internal components in EP elections since 1979 (Emanuele et al. 2019).  
 
electoral volatility in ep elections: national and temporal variations 
 
Starting with the first task, let us focus on the electoral instability of European party 
systems after the 2019 round of EP elections. Table 1 reports figures using the Pedersen 
(1979) index of electoral volatility for the 2019 EP election in the 28 EU countries. 
Overall, electoral volatility (Total Volatility, TV) in 2019 was 23.7. This quite re-
markable level of electoral instability has been driven by particularly highly volati-
le elections in some countries, such as the United Kingdom (50.4), Slovakia (41.6), 
and Italy (37.25). In as many as nine countries, this EP election has been the most 
volatile in each country’s EP electoral history: Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom, inclu-
ding both Western European (WE) and Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries. Moreover, in only three countries (Malta, Austria, and Cyprus) TV has been 
lower than 10, lower than the average volatility in WE national elections after World 
War II (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017).  
As expected, there are some differences between WE and CEE countries (re-
spectively, 20.7 and 28.2). Notwithstanding this – still relevant – difference betwe-
en the two regions, even Western European countries display a clear pattern of in-
stability, as the average volatility exceeds the threshold of 20 set by Mair (2011) for 
considering an election as highly volatile. The key difference that still distinguishes 
Western countries from their Central and Eastern counterparts can be found by di-
sentangling the aggregate index of electoral volatility between its two internal com-
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Table 1 - Electoral Volatility and its components in the 2019 EP elections, European Union
country regv altv othv total v
Austria 2.65 5.6 0.25 8.5
Belgium 0.55 16.8 0.65 18
Bulgaria 4.05 6.55 2.95 13.55
Croatia 8.55 11.75 10.2 30.5
Cyprus 2.75 4.3 1.9 8.95
Czech Republic 3.75 28.15 3.7 35.6
Denmark 4.45 19.4 23.85
Estonia 2.95 16 14.1 33.05
Finland 10.7 1.5 12.2
France 3.3 8.25 2.25 13.8
Germany 1.65 19.35 2.4 23.4
Greece 7.9 13 5.75 26.65
Hungary 6.3 13.4 0.65 20.35
Ireland 1.25 18.95 3.05 23.25
Italy 3.85 31.7 1.7 37.25
Latvia 6.3 21.35 1.35 29
Lithuania 4.75 19.6 8.15 32.5
Luxembourg 1.05 16.5 0.25 17.8
Malta 1.35 1.75 1.05 4.15
Netherlands 6.45 23 0.95 30.4
Poland 4.75 11.45 0.3 16.5
Portugal 6.2 9.05 1.8 17.05
Romania 12.55 6.55 5.9 25
Slovakia 22.25 15.75 3.6 41.6
Slovenia 20.05 11.6 1.25 32.9
Spain 17.25 2.55 19.8
Sweden 3.15 13.35 0.2 16.7
United Kingdom 16.5 31.6 2.3 50.4
Mean WE 3.71 15.33 1.68 20.71
Mean CEE 8.75 14.74 4.74 28.23
Mean EU 5.69 15.1 2.88 23.67
Note: RegV refers to Regeneration volatility, AltV to Alteration volatility, OthV to Other parties volatili-
ty. For more information, see Emanuele et al. (2019)
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ponents of Regeneration (RegV) and Alteration (AltV). The former measures the elec-
toral volatility due to the entry and exit of parties from the party system, while the 
latter is the electoral volatility caused by vote switching between existing parties.  
Table 1 shows that what accounts for most of the difference in electoral volati-
lity levels between the two regions is due to RegV: despite the recent wave of new 
party emergence in Western Europe (Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Emanuele and Chia-
ramonte 2018), CEE countries continue to represent a sort of ‘world apart’. Indeed, 
RegV is equal to 8.75 in CEE, against 3.7 in WE. In other words, in an average 2019 
EP election in CEE, one or more new parties emerge, accounting for 17.5% of votes, 
or one or more parties that existed in the 2014 election disappear.1 Conversely, the 
electoral shifts among established parties are similar in the two regions, as AltV is 
15.3 in WE and 14.7 in CEE.  
To fully understand the scope of party system change brought about by this round 
of EP elections, it is necessary to put the 2019 results into a longitudinal perspecti-
ve. Figure 1 reports the average levels of electoral volatility in Europe over time. We 
have divided the temporal span of the analysis into four meaningful electoral pha-
ses: the ‘Cold War’ period, 1979-1989; the ‘post-Wall’ period, 1989-1999; the ‘En-
largement’ phase, 1999-2009; and, ﬁnally, the ‘Recession’, after 2009. 
 
 
Figure 1. Components of electoral volatility in EP elections during different electoral phases 
 
party system change in eu countries
1. This finding is consistent with previous studies about the exceptionality of CEE as concern the 
multiplication of ‘electoral hurricanes’ due to new party emergence in national elections (Hou-
ghton and Deegan-Krause 2015).
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By looking more into detail at the data, what strikingly emerges from the ﬁgu-
re is that moving from phase 1 to phase 4, electoral volatility and its two internal com-
ponents have undergone a monotonic increase over time. TV has skyrocketed from 
12.5 in the Cold War period to 23.8 in the Recession. Turning to its internal com-
ponents, AltV shows a fairly constant increase over time, from 8.8 (ﬁrst phase) to 14.7 
(last phase), while RegV is almost stable in the ﬁrst three phases before a sharp up-
surge in the Recession phase (6.6). 
The monotonic increase of TV over time is not merely a descriptive fact but, ra-
ther, a robust ﬁnding. Table 2 shows the results of a multivariate regression analy-
sis of TV (Models 1 and 2) and its internal components (Models 3,AltV, and 4, RegV) 
on time (measured in years) and a dichotomous variable indicating CEE countries.  
Overall, evidence shows the effect of time on the increase in TV is signiﬁcant at 
the highest level of conﬁdence (p<0.01)2. Furthermore, our analysis shows this in-
crease over time is due only to the changing patterns in WE, given that CEE countries 
display very high but steady values of TV across the three electoral periods (2004-
2009, 2009-2014, 2014-2019). This is shown by Model 2, where an interaction bet-
ween time and the dichotomous variable for CEE proves not statistically signiﬁcant. 
Figure 2 below reports the Average Marginal Effect (AME) of time on volatility at the 
two possible values assumed by our dichotomous variable. As shown in the ﬁgure, 
the effect of time on TV is signiﬁcant only in the case of Western Europe. In other words, 
a ‘permanent instability’ is what has occurred in EP elections in CEE countries since 
2004, while an increasingly destructured party system is the dominant trend in WE. 
 
Figure 2. Average Marginal Effect of Time on TV in WE (CEE=0) and CEE (CEE=1) 
 
2. These findings are robust to alternative specifications: adding an additional dichotomous va-
riable to account for Southern European countries, performing a regression with country clu-
sters, a panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) regression, or a Prais-Winsten regression.
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By disentangling TV into RegV and AltV, Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 indicate that 
AltV shows the same increasing pattern over time as TV, with only an important dif-
ference: the dichotomous variable for CEE is not signiﬁcant, which means that the-
re are no differences in the AltV between the two regions, as compared to TV. Con-
versely, in the case of RegV, the effect of time is not signiﬁcant (as already mentio-
ned), while the analysis shows a powerful positive effect of the CEE dichotomous va-
riable. In other words, this means that a certain level of Regeneration volatility has 
always existed in EP elections, and this marks a clear difference compared to the hi-
storical patterns observed in Western European national elections (Bartolini and Mair 
1990; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017).  
 
comparing ep and national elections: still a significant difference? 
 
In the remaining part of this chapter, we raise two further research questions to ad-
dress the two tasks formulated at the beginning. First, to what extent do the levels 
and trends of electoral volatility in EP elections match or deviate from those obser-
ved in national elections in the same countries and phases. Second, whether this in-
creasing instability of party systems signals changing patterns of competition and 
cleavage structure across Europe. 
party system change in eu countries
Table 2 - Regression analysis of TV and its internal components (AltV and RegV)
model 1 (tv) model 2 (tv) model 3 (altv) model 4 (regv)
b se b se b se b se
Time 0.232** 0.068 0.238** 0.069 0.152** 0.051 0.054 0.036
CEE 9.075*** 1.798 15.82 11.429 2.600 1.340 4.493*** 0.959
Time*CEE -0.219 0.367
Constant 11.74*** 1.584 11.58*** 1.610 8.613*** 1.181 2.200* 0.845
R-squared 0.297 0.298 0.127 0.198
Number of 
elections 147 147 147 147
Number of 
countries 28 28 28 28
*p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Starting from the ﬁrst research quesiton (RQ), by considering all EP elections oc-
curred in the 28 member countries, volatility (TV) is equal to 19 (N=147), while in 
national elections, in the same countries and period, TV is 15.1. By disentangling 
this average between Western Europe (WE) and the CEE countries, TV in EP elec-
tions is 16.4 (N=118) in WE and 28.0 (N=29) in CEE. To make a comparison, in WE 
national elections, TV has been, on average, 12.3 and, in CEE national elections, 26.4.3   
As we have previously shown, this average TV in EP elections is the result of a 
sharp and monotonic increase over time (see Figure 1) and this is absolutely consi-
stent with the trends observed in TV in national elections in WE, speciﬁcally with 
regard to the last phase marked by the impact of the Great Recession (Drummond 
2006; Hérnandez and Kriesi 2016; Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017). Conversely, 
for CEE, we have evidence of sustained and prolonged instability ever since the de-
mocratic transition. However, recent studies have not detected an increase over time 
for CEE countries, but rather a steady trend or even a declrase (Lane and Ersson 2007; 
Casal Bértoa 2013; Emanuele, Chiaramonte and Soare 2018). 
All in all, and with some surprise, a clear difference between EP and national elec-
tions can be detected only in Western Europe.4 In this regard, the long-established 
second-order election theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980) stresses that, given that the-
re is less at stake in EP elections compared to national elections, voters are freer to 
cast a sincere vote, and they often exploit this opportunity to defect from governing 
parties or, more generally, from major parties to support opposition parties and new 
contenders. As a result, a higher TV is expected in EP elections compared to natio-
nal ones. To accurately gauge whether TV signiﬁcantly differs in two electoral are-
nas (EP and national ones) and to what extent such difference predicted by the se-
cond-order-election theory varies over time, we performed a regression analysis whe-
re the outcome is Total Volatility (TV) in both European and national elections, and 
the predictors are: a dichotomous variable for CEE countries, a categorical variable 
for phases (reference category: Cold War), and a dichotomous variable where 0 is 
attributed to TV in national elections, and 1 to TV in EP elections. Finally, we also 
added an interaction between the variable for EP vs national elections and the pha-
se variable.5 This interaction allows us to test whether being an EP election vs a na-
tional one has a signiﬁcant marginal effect on TV across phases. Figure 3 reports the 
average marginal effects  (AMEs) of the interaction. 
 
 
3. Data on WE have been taken from Emanuele (2015), while, for CEE, from Emanuele Chia-
ramonte and Soare (2018). 
4. This result is similar to the one found by Caramani (2015), whose analysis does not consider 
elections after 2009. This means that the recent Recession phase has not changed the overall 
volatility pattern between national and EP elections. 
5. Results are not shown but are available upon request.
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Figure 3. Average Marginal Effect of EP vs national elections at different phases 
Figure 3 shows that the marginal effect of the dummy distinguishing EP elections 
from national ones has a signiﬁcant effect only during the Enlargement phase. This 
ﬁnding is rather surprising, as it shows that the distinction between EP and natio-
nal elections does not make a difference for predicting TV scores neither until 1999 
nor after 2009. In the ﬁrst two phases, European party systems are still in a phase 
of relative electoral stability, and the above ﬁnding means that EP elections do not 
bring a signiﬁcant additional instability compared to national elections. Converse-
ly, the non-signiﬁcant marginal effect in the Recession phase, characterised – as seen 
earlier – by skyrocketing electoral volatility, witnesses a general convergence towards 
instability, regardless of the type of election. To sum up, this analysis rejects, except 
for the 1999-2009 period and at least for this limited aspect related to the expected 
difference in volatility between the two electoral arenas, the second-order election 
model. 
 
below the surface:  
a changing cleavage structure in european party systems? 
 
What remains to be explored is our second RQ, namely, whether the detected in-
creasing instability witnesses the presence of changing patterns of competition and 
cleavage structure in European party systems. To do so, we have resorted to a tra-
ditional conceptual and empirical tool, namely, bloc volatility (Bartolini and Mair 
1990). The concept of bloc volatility refers to the net change in the aggregate vote 
share for all parties included in a given bloc.6 For a long time, given the predomi-
party system change in eu countries
6. Bloc volatility is a component of TV, the other one being the electoral shifts among parties wi-
thin the same bloc (Within-Bloc volatility).
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nance of the left-right dimension of competition in Europe (Fuchs and Klingemann 
1990), the concept of bloc has been intrinsically connected to that of cleavage and, 
more specifically, of class cleavage (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Bartolini 2000). No-
netheless, the concept and the measurement of bloc volatility can be extended be-
yond the class cleavage, to capture the divide produced by any given cleavage. In this 
regard, besides the class cleavage, recent studies have emphasized the emergence 
of a new important transnational cleavage, that has been thought to structure po-
litical conflict in Europe. Kriesi and others (2006; 2008; 2012) have extensively ana-
lysed the emergence of a ‘demarcation-integration’ cleavage, opposing the so-cal-
led ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalisation. This cleavage is based on three main di-
mensions: one related to the opposition to free trade and open markets (economic 
globalisation vs. protectionism); the second related to the EU dimension (pro-EU vs. 
anti-EU); and the third one related to being in favour or against multiculturalism and 
immigration.7 
To capture the characteristics of the cleavage structure in European party systems 
and their evolution over time, we have calculated, in each country and election pe-
riod, the vote share received by parties belonging to the class and the demarcation 
blocs and also the related class bloc volatility and demarcation bloc volatility. To do 
so, we refer to the classiﬁcation of parties in the two blocs provided in Emanuele et 
al. (2019) and based on both quantitative and qualitative criteria8. According to the 
theoretical framework of Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Bartolini (2000), the strength 
of a cleavage can be captured by two indicators. The ﬁrst, straightforwardly, is the 
aggregate vote share of parties politicising that cleavage: the larger this vote share 
is, the more relevant this division is in the society.  
The second indicator can be captured by the mobility of voters across the clea-
vage line. The interpretation of this second indicator depends on the degree of ma-
turity of the cleavage: in cases of a consolidated cleavage, like the class one, limi-
ted electoral mobility across the cleavage line signals that voters conceive that con-
ﬂict mainly as a dimension of identiﬁcation. Conversely, high electoral mobility across 
the cleavage line witnesses that voters no longer consider that conﬂict as relevant, 
given they cross it between consecutive elections. On the other side, for emerging 
cleavages, like the alleged demarcation one, the ﬁrst phase of political and electo-
ral instauration is usually characterised by a relevant mobility across the cleavage 
line, as voters move towards parties emphasising the new cleavage. Therefore, in this 
context, the new cleavage is mainly a dimension of competition.  
 
7. Different scholars have supported the idea of the existence of this new cleavage by providing 
a vast range of conceptualisation (Bornschier 2010; De Vries 2018; Strijbis, Helmer and De 
Wilde 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018). For more details, see the codebook in Emanuele et al. 
(2019). 
8. For further information on the operationalisation and classification methods, see the code-
book in Emanuele et al. (2019).
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Figure 4. Aggregate vote share for parties in the class and demarcation blocs in EP elections across 
different electoral phases 
Figure 4 patently shows a different evolution of the two cleavages over time. On 
the one hand, the traditional class cleavage has experienced a sharp decline over time 
in the vote share of parties politicising it (Communist, Socialist, and Social-Demo-
cratic ones). This ﬁnding is, of course, not new and largely discussed by the litera-
ture (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992; Drummond 
2006), but what really strikes us is the evolution of the vote share of parties belon-
ging to the deemed demarcation bloc, which has undergone an opposite, increasing, 
trend over time. While, in the 1980s, the ratio between the two blocs was more than 
4:1 in favour of the class bloc, in the last decade, this ratio has shrunk to 1.3:1, with 
a class bloc representing, on average, 26% of the vote share vs. a demarcation bloc 
following with an average of 19.6. 
 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of TV, class bloc volatility, and demarcation bloc volatility across different phases 
party system change in eu countries
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Yet, this is just the ﬁrst part of the story. Figure 5 tells us the second part, com-
paring the mobility across the cleavage line for the two cleavages. We observe two 
distinct patterns for the two cleavages also in terms of bloc volatility. The class bloc 
shows a fairly stable volatility over time, which is also very limited compared to TV. 
This brings us to a crucial point: notwithstanding the sharp electoral decline observed 
above, class bloc volatility still represents a domain of identiﬁcation for a – more and 
more limited – portion of the electorate. Indeed, it also interesting to note that, in 
an age of increasing electoral instability, bloc volatility, which represents a compo-
nent of TV, has not followed the same upwards trend, which also means that vola-
tility is more and more accounted for by different dimensions of competition besi-
des class. 
The demarcation bloc volatility is different. In this regard, Figure 5 shows that, 
from the ﬁrst to the last phase, the level of electoral mobility across the cleavage line 
has tripled. This is a largely expected outcome in the case of emerging cleavages, whe-
re, at the beginning, bloc volatility is limited because of the very small vote share of 
parties competing on that dimension, and, then, as these parties obtain increasing 
percentages of votes and a larger portion of the electorate abandons older allegiances 
for this new one, bloc volatility consequently rises. This trend signals that demar-
cation bloc volatility represents more and more a domain of competition in Europe. 
Finally, it is interesting to take a look at the national variations of cleavage struc-
ture conﬁguration in Europe. Figure 6 plots the 28 EU countries across two dimen-
sions based on, respectively, the average volatility of parties in the class and de-
marcation blocs. The chart can be divided into four quadrants according to the mean 
values of the two variables. 
 
 
Figure 6. National variations of class bloc volatility and demarcation bloc volatility in Europe 
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Starting from the lower right quadrant, we ﬁnd four ‘consensual’ (Lijphart 1999) 
democracies (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands), where class represents 
a domain of identiﬁcation (class bloc volatility is lower than the European average), 
while the demarcation bloc volatility is comparatively high. This means that, next 
to the class cleavage, a new dimension of competition has been consolidating: let us 
notice the presence, in these four countries, of relevant parties belonging to the de-
marcation bloc, such as, among others, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Flemish 
Interest (VB) in Belgium, Alternative for Germany (AFD), and the Dutch Party for 
Freedom (PVV).  
A different situation can be found in the upper right quadrant, where the de-
marcation bloc is also on the rise, but the high mobility across the class cleavage is 
likely to witness a reduced capacity of class to represent a domain of identiﬁcation 
for voters. This quadrant mixes Western European countries with Central and Ea-
stern European countries. The former are clearly facing a reshaping of their dimensions 
of competition, with a decline of traditional parties to the advantage of challenger 
parties (France, Italy, the United Kingdom). The latter (Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries) are countries where the class bloc has always been limited (Hun-
gary) or has experienced a deep decline (Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
Moreover, in as much as 11 countries (lower left quadrant), both cleavages show 
a pattern of electoral stability. This may be due to the low relevance of the cleava-
ge as a dimension of conﬂict (such as the paradigmatic case of Ireland for class), or 
to the fact that the cleavage has already stabilised, thus becoming a central domain 
of identiﬁcation. Obvious examples of this circumstance are Spain and Portugal, in 
the case of class, and Poland for demarcation. This latter represents an exception in 
the demarcation cleavage, as parties referring to the demarcation bloc total an ave-
rage support of 37.1%, witnessing that, in this country, this cleavage has successfully 
overcome its phase of instauration and consolidation, becoming the main domain 
of identiﬁcation. 
Lastly, in the upper left quadrant, we ﬁnd ﬁve countries (Croatia, Cyprus, Lat-
via, Romania, and Slovenia) where there are no parties at all representing the de-
marcation bloc and where the volatility for the class bloc is comparatively high. Also, 
here, we ﬁnd Estonia, an outlier with the largest class bloc volatility in Europe by far, 
which means that voters massively cross the class cleavage line in consecutive elec-
tions, thus not recognising it as a proper dimension of conﬂict.  
 
conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have explored features of European party systems, both following 
the 2019 EP elections and also from a longitudinal viewpoint, by focusing on electoral 
volatility. Among our main findings, we have discussed the remarkable electoral mo-
bility brought about by the recent round of EP elections. This can be seen as the last 
step of a long-term process of increasing instability, at least in Western Europe, whi-
le Central and Eastern European countries have been always characterized by a per-
manent instability since their accession to the EU. Interestingly, from a longitudinal 
party system change in eu countries
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perspective, a substantial difference in electoral volatility between EP and national 
elections is detectable only between 1999 and 2009. This piece of evidence signals 
the second-order election model, at least from the viewpoint of electoral volatility, 
appears not anmore very suited to fully describe EP elections – and their differences 
from national elections. Finally, we have also focused on the stability and changes in 
party systems concerning the structure and the evolution of the class and the de-
marcation cleavages across Europe. Our analysis has shown a marked decline in the 
class cleavage which, even if  it still represents an important domain of identification 
in many European countries, is now flanked in most countries by the demarcation clea-
vage, which has undergone a process of development or even consolidation.  
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